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Abstract
Bell’s theorem has fascinated physicists and philosophers since his 1964 paper,
which was written in response to the 1935 paper of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen.
Bell’s theorem and its many extensions have led to the claim that quantum mechan-
ics and by inference nature herself are nonlocal in the sense that a measurement
on a system by an observer at one location has an immediate effect on a distant
entangled system (one with which the original system has previously interacted).
Einstein was repulsed by such “spooky action at a distance” and was led to ques-
tion whether quantum mechanics could provide a complete description of physical
reality. In this paper I argue that quantum mechanics does not require spooky
action at a distance of any kind and yet it is entirely reasonable to question the
assumption that quantum mechanics can provide a complete description of physical
reality. The magic of entangled quantum states has little to do with entanglement
and everything to do with superposition, a property of all quantum systems and a
foundational tenet of quantum mechanics.
Keywords: Quantum nonlocality · Bell’s theorem · Foundations of quantum me-
chanics · Measurement problem
∗This is an expanded version of a talk given at the 2016 Princeton-TAMU Symposium on Quantum
Noise Effects in Thermodynamics, Biology and Information [1].
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21 Introduction
In the 80 years since the seminal 1935 Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paper (EPR)[2], physi-
cists and philosophers have mused about what Einstein referred to as “spooky action at
a distance”. Bell’s 1964 analysis of an EPR-type experiment, “On the Einstein Podolsky
Rosen Paradox”[3], has been cited more than 10,000 times and most of these have been
in the last decade. Many of these describe experimental work on testing quantum me-
chanical predictions related to entangled states and, as an experimentalist, I have great
admiration for much of this work. On the other hand many, if not most, of the remain-
der are theoretical and philosophical papers trying to come to grips with what is often
referred to as the nonlocality of quantum mechanics. According to David Mermin [4],
physicists’ views of Bell’s theorem fall “between the majority position of near indifference
and the minority position of wild extravagance.” At the “wild extravagance” extreme is,
perhaps, Henry Stapp who pronounced, “Bell’s theorem is the most profound discovery
of science.”[5] Mermin advocates a balanced position between these two extremes. A dis-
tinguished Princeton physicist (Arthur Wightman?) concurred with Mermin’s view but
added, “Anybody who’s not bothered by Bell’s theorem has to have rocks in his head.”[4].
My view also lies in this middle ground but, I suspect, is closer to “near indifference” than
Mermin’s.
Bell’s theorem provides a general test, in the form of an inequality, that the results
of an EPR type gedanken experiment must satisfy if it is describable by any classical
theory, even one with hidden variables, so long as such a model is locally causal. Bell
then proceeded to demonstrate how the predictions of quantum mechanics violate this
inequality. His conclusion was that any hidden variable theory designed to reproduce the
predictions of quantum mechanics must necessarily be nonlocal and allow superluminal
interactions. In Bell’s words[3],
In a theory in which parameters are added to quantum mechanics to deter-
mine the results of individual measurements, without changing the statistical
predictions, there must be a mechanism whereby the setting of one measure-
ment device can influence the reading of another instrument, however remote.
Moreover, the signal involved must propagate instantaneously, so that such a
theory could not be Lorentz invariant.
While I suspect that most physicists never doubted the veracity of the predictions of
quantum theory, 8 years later Freedman and Clauser[6] provided experimental verifica-
3tion of a violation of Bell’s inequality. As a consequence, a large class of local hidden
variable theories were immediately ruled out1. On the other hand, a demonstration of a
violation of Bell’s inequality certainly does not immediately imply that nonlocality is a
characteristic feature of quantum mechanics let alone a fundamental property of nature.
Nevertheless, many physicists and philosophers of science do harbor this belief. In fact,
Bell later described the violation of his inequalities as pointing to the“gross nonlocality of
nature”[8]. Statements like “If one assumes the world to be real, then Bell-experiments
have proven that it is nonlocal”[9] and “Bell’s theorem asserts that if certain predictions of
quantum theory are correct then our world is nonlocal...experiments thus establish that
our world is nonlocal”[10] abound in scientific publications, and especially in popular
literature. Experts in the field often use the term “nonlocality” to designate particular
non-classical aspects of quantum entanglement and do not confuse the term with super-
luminal interactions. However, many physicists and philosophers seem to take the term
more literally.
For me the term nonlocality is so fraught with misinterpretation that I feel we’d all
be better off if it were removed from discourse on quantum mechanics. I confess that I’m
neither a theoretical physicist nor a philosopher but rather an experimental physicist and
observational astronomer and it’s from this vantage point that I’ll try to convince you
that quantum mechanics does not require spooky action at a distance of any kind and
will then tell you to what I attribute the magic of quantum mechanical entanglement.
But first, a brief review of quantum entanglement and why this phenomenon has led to
claims of the nonlocality of quantum mechanics.
2 Quantum Nonlocality
Consider two microscopic quantum systems, A and B, that interact with each other and
then fly off in opposite directions. According to quantum mechanics, the results of mea-
surements made on A will be correlated with those made on B. Furthermore, by changing
the experimental arrangement used to observe subsystem A, the correlations with the
results of the measurements on remote subsystem B will also change. The seemingly
plausible implication is that the results of the measurements on B directly depend on the
1David Bohm, building on de Broglie’s notion of a pilot wave, had already created a nonlocal hidden
variable theory[7] that reproduced all the predictions of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Because of
its nonlocality, it does not violate Bell’s inequality.
4choice of measurements made on A independent of the distance between the two.2 This
simple argument is specious, as will be clarified shortly. To be sure, Bell’s demonstration
that any classical, hidden variable treatment of the system demands acausal, superlumi-
nal signals provides sufficient grounds to summarily dismiss such classically based models.
However, to turn the argument around and assert the nonlocality of nature is not justified.
So how are the arguments for the nonlocality of quantum mechanics (and nature)
constructed? There are a plethora of points of view in the literature. I offer the following
two simply to provide counterpoint to my subsequent account. Physicist/philosopher
Abner Shimony puts it like this[11]:
Locality is a condition on composite systems with spatially separated con-
stituents, requiring an operator which is the product of operators associated
with the individual constituents to be assigned a value which is the product
of the values assigned to the factors, and requiring the value assigned to an
operator associated with an individual constituent to be independent of what
is measured on any other constituent.
With a little thought, it is evident that Shimony’s definition of locality precludes precisely
the types of correlations that quantum mechanics demands in which case there is no
more to be said. However, I find that this definition of locality to be reminiscent of the
classicality that Bell inequality experiments, among many others, have already disproved.
In fact, it amounts to little more than defining quantum mechanics to be nonlocal. This
is not to say that Shimony does not appreciate the subtleness of designating quantum
mechanics to be nonlocal. He continues,
Yes, something is communicated superluminally when measurements are made
upon systems characterized by an entangled state, but that something is in-
formation, and there is no Relativistic locality principle which constrains its
velocity...This point of view is very successful at accounting for the arbitrar-
ily fast connection between the outcomes of correlated measurements, but it
scants the objective features of the quantum state. Especially it scants the
fact that the quantum state probabilistically controls the occurrence of actual
events.
2However, because these correlations can only be interpreted in terms of a quantum mechanical sta-
tistical distribution of many such observations, no usable information can be transmitted from A to B in
this way thereby preserving consistency with special relativity.
5In addition, Shimony acknowledges that nonlocality is far from clear-cut and is closely
related to the measurement problem and the concomitant wave function collapse (a topic
to which I’ll return later).
The peculiar kind of causality exhibited when measurements at stations with
space-like separation are correlated is a symptom of the slipperiness of the
space-time behavior of potentialities. This is the point of view tentatively
espoused by the present writer, but admittedly without full understanding.
What is crucially missing is a rational account of the relation between poten-
tialities and actualities – just how the wave function probabilistically controls
the occurrence of outcomes. In other words, a real understanding of the po-
sition tentatively espoused depends upon a solution to another great problem
in the foundations of quantum mechanics – the problem of reduction of the
wave packet.
Physicist H. W. Wiseman, an expert in quantum information theory, reviewed the his-
tory of quantum nonlocality in “From Einstein’s Theorem to Bell’s Theorem: A History
of Quantum Nonlocality”[9]. Referring to Einstein’s autobiographical notes[12], he con-
cludes that Einstein’s logical deduction (from the EPR gedanken experiment) is that one
of the following three premises must be false: 1) quantum mechanics is a complete the-
ory; 2) locality as implied by special relativity; or 3) the independent reality of physically
separated objects. In their 1935 EPR paper, the conclusion was that quantum mechanics
does not provide a complete description of reality. However, Wiseman maintains that
after Bell’s theorem, the implication is that “even if statistical QM is not complete...[it]
violates locality or reality”. It is clear from the first paragraph of Bell’s paper[3] that he
concurred with this conclusion. The subsequent experimental verification of EPR type
entanglement then leaves two possibilities, “the world is nonlocal – events happen which
violate the principles of relativity or objective reality does not exist – there is no matter
of fact about distant events”[9]. For Wiseman the latter possibility smacks of solipsism.
“Compared to solipsism, the proposition that relativity is not fundamental, and that the
world is nonlocal, seems the lesser of two evils.”3 Wiseman concludes that
If one assumes the world to be real, then Bell-experiments have proven that it is
3Rather than embracing either nonlocality or solipsism, Mermin’s[4] more balanced position is sim-
ply that the experimental verification of the violation of Bell’s inequality provides direct evidence that
excludes Einstein’s particular concept of an “independent existence of the physical reality.”
6nonlocal. The nonlocality demonstrated in these experiments does not enable
superluminal signalling (and does not allow a preferred reference frame to be
identified). It has therefore been called uncontrollable nonlocality, to contrast
with (hypothetical) controllable nonlocality which would enable superluminal
signaling. But this uncontrollable nonlocality is not purely notional. It can be
used to perform tasks which would be impossible in a world conforming to the
postulates of relativity. Thus, uncontrollable nonlocality reduces the status of
relativity theory from fundamental to phenomenological.
In a footnote Wiseman adds, “To be scrupulous, there are perhaps four other ways that
the correlations in such an experiment could be explained away.” It is the first way that is
relevant here because it is related to the position that I put forward below, namely “One
could simply ‘refuse to consider the correlations mysterious’”. Wiseman notes that Bell
counters this explanation with[13] “Outside [the] peculiar context [of quantum philoso-
phy], such an attitude would be dismissed as unscientific. The scientific attitude is that
correlations cry out for explanation.” I’ll return to this sentiment shortly.
Two philosophers who represent the current pro-nonlocality side of the debate are
David Albert and Tim Maudlin. While acknowledging that nonlocal quantum influences
“cannot possibly be exploited to transmit a detectable signal...to carry information, non-
locally, between any two distant points”, Albert [14] is unequivocal that “What Bell has
given us is proof that there is as a matter of fact a genuine nonlocality in the actual
workings of nature, however we attempt to describe it, period.” Similarly, Maudlin [15]
“argued that the results are unequivocal:”
Violation of Bell’s inequality does not require superluminal matter or energy
transport.
Violation of Bell’s inequality does not entail the possibility of superluminal
signaling.
Violation of Bell’s inequality does require superluminal causal connections.
Violation of Bell’s inequality can be accomplished only if there is superluminal
information transmission.
Taking the nonlocality of quantum mechanics as a given, these two philosophers, in
Maudlin’s words[15], “must turn our attention to the question of the compatability of
that non-locality with the relativistic picture of space-time. We must take up the question
7of whether a complete quantum theory can be rendered Lorentz invariant.” While their
quest has not yet succeeded, the works of these two philosophers critically evaluate several
notable attempts. Two related assumptions that are often made in such deliberations are
(even if sometimes unspoken): 1) A fundamental physical theory must provide a complete
description of physical reality (Einstein’s quest); and 2) The problem of wave function
collapse (the measurement problem) needs to be resolved (as Shimony declared). The
present paper challenges the very nonlocality that these authors accept as well as the
notions of completeness and wave function collapse (see Section 6). As a consequence, I
will refrain from commenting further on their works.
3 The Separation Principle
The conclusion of EPR was not that quantum mechanics is nonlocal nor that objective
reality does not exist but rather that quantum mechanics is not a complete description of
reality4. The argument in the EPR paper was based on a demonstration that quantum
mechanics cannot simultaneously contain all elements of physical reality. Podolsky wrote
the paper and Einstein was less than satisfied with it. Howard[16] points out that in a
letter to Schro¨dinger written a month after the EPR paper was published, Einstein chose
to base his argument for incompleteness on what he termed the “separation principle” and
continued to present this argument “in virtually all subsequent published and unpublished
discussions of the problem.”[16] According to the separation principle, the real state of
affairs in one part of space cannot be affected instantaneously or superluminally by events
in a distant part of space. In his letter to Schro¨dinger, Einstein explained[16]
After the collision, the real state of (AB) consists precisely of the real state A
and the real state of B, which two states have nothing to do with one another.
The real state of B thus cannot depend upon the kind of measurement I carry
out on A [separation hypothesis]. But then for the same state of B there are
two (in general arbitrarily many) equally justified ΨB, which contradicts the
hypothesis of a one-to-one or complete description of the real states.
In some ways, I completely agree with a separation principle; however, from my exper-
imentalist perspective, I would interpret it as “If systems A and B are spatially separated,
4 As just mentioned, Bell and Wiseman argue that even if quantum mechanics is incomplete, the
quantum mechanical violation of Bell’s inequality implies that it either violates the principles of relativity
or objective reality does not exist.
8then a measurement of system A can, in no way, have any effect on any possible measure-
ment of system B.” Whereas Einstein’s principle required that a measurement of system
A can have no effect on the state of system B, the experimentalist’s separation principle
requires that a measurement of system A can have no effect on the result of any measure-
ment on system B. I know of no experimental evidence to the contrary of this principle
nor does standard quantum mechanics predict any such violation. It is interesting that
in the very first paragraph of his paper Bell defined locality in precisely this way, i.e., “It
is the requirement of locality or more precisely that the result of an experiment on one
system be unaffected by operations on a distant system with which it has interacted in the
past, that creates the essential difficulty.”[3] However, the “difficulty” only presents itself
when applied in conjunction with classical-type hidden variables, which are not present
in ordinary quantum mechanics.
As an illustration, consider Bell’s original gedanken experiment (due to Bohm and
Aharonov[17]): the emission of two oppositely moving spin 1
2
particles in a singlet state.
Their combined wave function is given by
Ψ(1, 2) =
1√
2
{|1, ↑〉|2, ↓〉 − |1, ↓〉|2, ↑〉}z (3.1)
where ↑ and ↓ indicate the z components of the spins of particles 1 and 2. Now suppose
that the spin of particle 1 is measured with a Stern-Gerlach apparatus oriented in the zˆ
direction and is determined to be ↑. The usual statement is that such a measurement
instantaneously collapses the wave function of particle 2 such that Ψ(2) = |2, ↓〉z. On the
other hand, the original wave function can also be expressed as
Ψ(1, 2) =
1√
2
{|1, ↑〉|2, ↓〉 − |1, ↓〉|2, ↑〉}x (3.2)
Then, if the spin of particle 1 is measured with a Stern-Gerlach apparatus oriented in
the xˆ direction and is determined to be ↑, the wave function of particle 2 collapses to
Ψ(2) = |2, ↓〉x. This violates Einstein’s separation principle that the measurement of
particle 1 can have no effect on the state of particle 2. Yet, this scenario does not violate
the experimentally motivated separation principle. If one measures particle 1 to be ↑
in any direction, we know the measurement of particle 2 has to be ↓. This perfect
(anti)correlation is built into the two particle system because they are in a singlet state.
Of course one might argue, as did Einstein, that the above scenario provides evidence
that the result of the measurement on particle 1 causes a change in the state of particle
2. However, this requires a precise definition of the notion of a state as well as of cause.
9If one defines state as the probability distribution of possible outcomes of a measurement
of particle 2, then Einstein’s separation principle is the same as the experimentalist’s
separation principle for which there is no conflict with quantum mechanics. Even if one
defines state in such a way that it is changed in the above scenario, the notion of a cause
offers little in the way of explanation if no physical model of the cause is offered.
The problem becomes a bit stickier if one measures the spin of particle 1 in an arbitrary
direction nˆ where nˆ · zˆ = cos θ. It is convenient to express |1, ↑〉 and |1, ↓〉 in an nˆ basis,
i.e.,
|1, ↑〉z = cos θ
2
|1, ↑〉n + sin θ
2
|1, ↓〉n (3.3)
and
|1, ↓〉z = − sin θ
2
|1, ↑〉n + cos θ
2
|1, ↓〉n (3.4)
It is straightforward to show that the correlation of the measured components of the spins
of the two particles in the nˆ and zˆ directions is given by − cos θ (with the spins in units
of ~/2). That is, the correlations between the measurements of the two distant systems
are changed, which may seem to be a problem for any separation principle. How is it that
the original states of the two particles know about the perfect anti-correlation, this new
correlation and, in fact, about every correlation of all conceivable measurements made on
the two particles? Well, that’s the magic of quantum mechanics but it does not violate
the experimentalist separation principle.
Suppose observer 1 (the observer of particle 1) chooses an apparatus to measure the
spin in the nˆ direction and that choice were somehow immediately (superluminally) trans-
mitted to and affects the measurement of particle 2 in the zˆ direction a moment latter. If
the events that define these two measurements have a space-like separation, as in the EPR
experiment, it is not possible for them to be unambiguously time ordered. Because of
their space-like separation, it is straightforward to identify another inertial observer who
will claim that the observation of the spin of particle 2 occurs well before that of particle
1. Then either knowledge of the choice of the experimental arrangement of observer 1
must be communicated backward in time to observer 2, or the results of the measurement
of particle 2 must be subsequently communicated to 1 and determine observer 1’s choice
of the experimental arrangement. The former certainly wreaks havoc with causality while
the latter seriously compromises free will. In fact, one needn’t appeal to other inertial
observers. Within a common rest frame of the two observations, simply have the obser-
vation of 2 take place well before (i.e., much closer to the interaction region) than the
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observation of 1. Now suppose that the result of that measurement is sent via a light
signal to a third party located midway between the two observers and is recorded in a lab
notebook well before observer 1 makes the choice of the direction nˆ. Then it is absolute
clear that that choice of measurement of 1 could have no possible effect on the measure-
ment of 2, superluminal or otherwise, as is consistent with the experimentalist separation
principle. After all, the measurement of 2 is “written in stone” before the choice of nˆ is
made. The correlations of many such measurements will be those predicted by quantum
mechanics regardless of the choice of measurements. All those correlations are built into
the entangled wave function of the two particles. As for the measurements of particle 1
and 2 themselves, they have absolutely no effect on each other. There is no spooky action
at a distance.
4 Correlations in Single Particle States
Okay, so how do I explain the magic of the correlations of entangled quantum mechanical
systems? First, a quick review of Bell’s theorem. Let P (aˆ, bˆ) denote the correlation of
spin measurements of particles 1 and 2 along the directions aˆ and bˆ respectively (Bell’s
notation). Then the inequality derived by Bell (roughly a one page proof), 1 + P (bˆ, cˆ) ≥
|P (aˆ, bˆ) − P (aˆ, cˆ)|, is the condition that must be satisfied by any classical, local, hidden
variable description of the hypothetical singlet spin system. Suppose that bˆ is in the
zˆ direction while aˆ and cˆ are in directions that are ±θ from the zˆ direction. Then
from the quantum mechanical correlation analysis above, Bell’s inequality takes the form
1 − cos θ ≥ | cos 2θ − cos θ|, which is clearly violated for 0 < θ < pi/2 (the domain of
applicability of the inequality). The implication is that quantum mechanics is inconsistent
with any classical, local, hidden variable theory.
The violation of the Bell inequality arises from the quantum mechanical prediction of
the correlations of measurements of the spins, i.e., P (zˆ, nˆ) = − cos θ, but this correlation
arises directly from the single particle wave function. Suppose a spin 1
2
particle is in the
| ↑〉z state. This can be written in the nˆ basis as |1, ↑〉z = cos θ2 |1, ↑〉n + sin θ2 |1, ↓〉n. Now
consider the correlation between a measurement of the particle’s spin in the zˆ direction
and a hypothetical measurement of the spin of the same particle in the nˆ direction. Then
P (zˆ, nˆ) = 〈↑ |zσzσn(cos θ
2
| ↑〉n + sin θ
2
| ↓〉n) = cos θ (4.5)
where σz and σn are the spin operators in the zˆ and nˆ directions. This is the same cor-
11
relation as for Bell’s gedanken experiment except for the minus sign, which is due to the
singlet state of Bell’s two particles. One can easily make them exactly the same simply
by requiring either of the measurements to change the sign of the output. So it would
seem (more on this later) that this hypothetical measurement also violates Bell’s inequal-
ity even though there is no question of nonlocality, superluminal interactions, or even
entanglement. After all, there’s only a single particle. Of course, the measurement of the
spin in the nˆ direction is only hypothetical because one cannot simultaneously measure
components corresponding to non-commuting operators. Philosophers refer to the results
of such a measurement as counterfactually definite, a notion that is uncontroversial in
deterministic classical physics. Bell’s theorem clearly makes use of counterfactual defi-
niteness; his inequality involves the correlations of the spins of the two particles in each of
two different directions that correspond to non-commuting spin components. This use of
counterfactuals is entirely appropriate because it is used to investigate a test for classical
hidden variable theories. Even so, I realize that one might object to such a counterfactual
gedanken experiment in the present single particle scenario. However, the purpose of
this hypothetical experiment is to demonstrate that the resulting correlation has little to
do with entanglement, nonlocality, and superluminal signals and everything to do with
superposition and the nature of quantum states, whether entangled or not. One can ren-
der the counterfactual measurement to be an actual measurement by cloning the original
single particle state and performing an actual measurement on the cloned state. In effect,
this is precisely what Bell’s singlet entangled state accomplishes.
In fact, one needn’t couch the discussion in terms of a counterfactual measurement.
Suppose we simply prepare an isolated system in a | ↑〉z state and then subsequently
measure the spin in the nˆ direction. The mean value of the measured spin would again
be the same cos θ as in Bell’s gedanken experiment. This follows directly from the single
particle decomposition in Eq. 3.3. Bell’s spin singlet system might well be considered to
be a prescription for preparing such a single particle state but this in no way indicates
that the remote measurement of particle 2 has any effect whatsoever on the measurement
of particle 1. The latter follows directly from the quantum properties of the single particle
wave function.
Yet another way of posing the single particle scenario is to consider two actual mea-
surements of the spin in the zˆ and nˆ directions. The experimental arrangement is a
Stern-Gerlach apparatus aligned in the zˆ direction with another Stern-Gerlach apparatus
located in the upper arm of the former but aligned in the nˆ direction (see Fig. 1). Elec-
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Figure 1: Double Stern-Gerlach Apparatus
tron counters, D1 and D2, are placed at the two outputs of the 2nd apparatus. If there
is a detection in either of these two outputs, then we know that the state of the electron
incident on the 2nd apparatus is | ↑〉z and so can consider this to be a measurement of
the zˆ component of the spin of the incident electron. On the other hand, | ↑〉z can be
represented as |1, ↑〉z = cos θ2 |1, ↑〉n + sin θ2 |1, ↓〉n and so the specific counter that registers
the detection can be considered a measurement of the nˆ component of the spin. Then
the correlation of the spin of the incident electron, +1, with the spin detected by the
second apparatus is again given by P (zˆ, nˆ) = cos θ. In this case the final step of the two
measurements performed on a single particle occur simultaneously and so nonlocality,
superluminal wave function collapse, and entanglement are all irrelevant.
While the single particle scenario results in the same correlations as in the two particle
spin singlet system of Bell, does this imply that the former also constitutes a violation
of a Bell-type inequality and thereby demonstrates the fallacy of hidden variable theo-
ries? The answer is, in general, no. Bell [18] pointed out that the single particle case
does provides an example of von Neumann’s “no hidden variables” proof; however, that
proof involved an assumption that Bell and others (e.g., Mermin[19]) characterized as
“silly”. Bell went on to construct a viable hidden variable theory for a single spin 1
2
particle that didn’t rely on von Neumann’s silly condition.5 Therefore, the single particle
case is not particularly useful in evaluating the viability of hidden variable theories nor
illuminating arguments for the nonlocality of quantum mechanics. On the other hand,
5 Mermin [19] provided a simpler version of this construction.
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the two measurement Stern-Gerlach scenario above can be couched in terms of the four-
dimensional , two particle subject of the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem[19] that illustrates
the incompatibility of quantum mechanics with hidden variable theories contingent on the
assumption of “noncontextuality”6 of the latter. Bell[18] also considered this assumption
unreasonable but Mermin would not go so far [19]. While one might argue with applying
the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem to the above two measurement single particle scenario,
I remind the reader that the purpose of the single particle scenarios is not to comment on
the viability of hidden variable theories per se but rather to shed light on the origin of the
quantum mechanical correlations that figured so critically in Bell’s proof and thereby to
help explain the magic of quantum mechanical entanglement. The point is that the two
particles in Bell’s spin singlet system each carry with them the single particle correlations
that are eventually manifested in correlated observations of the entangled state. That
is, the magic of the correlations of Bell’s entangled system is a direct consequence of the
quantum behavior of a single spin 1
2
particle.
5 Entanglement and Quantum Nonlocality
As I pointed out above, Bell’s definition of locality is essentially the same as the experimen-
tally motived separation principle, which I claim is not violated by quantum mechanics.
So why did he find that quantum mechanics violates his inequality and, hence, the notion
of locality? The problem comes from the translation of his verbal definition of locality into
its mathematical expression in the context of hidden variables. In his notation, let A(aˆ, λ)
and B(bˆ, λ) represent the results of the spin measurements of particles 1 and 2 in the aˆ
and bˆ directions respectively. Then Bell expresses the expectation value of the product
of (the correlation of) the two measurements as P (aˆ, bˆ) =
∫
dλρ(λ)A(aˆ, λ)B(bˆ, λ) where
λ represents any hidden variables with statistical distribution ρ(λ). This is analogous to
the product of operators definition (given by Shimony) that precludes the types of corre-
lations that quantum mechanics demands. Therefore, Bell’s mathematical expression of
locality goes beyond his initially stated experimentalist separation principle.
To be sure, in his 1964 paper, Bell did not conclude that quantum mechanics is non-
local, only that a classical hidden variable model designed to reproduce the statistical
predictions of quantum mechanics must necessarily be nonlocal. However, in a subse-
6Noncontextuality is the assumption that a hidden variable theory must assign to an observable a
value that is independent of the complete disposition of the relevant measuring apparatus.
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quent paper[8], he formalized “a notion of local causality” that was directly applicable
to quantum mechanics and concluded that quantum mechanics itself is nonlocal. This
analysis used a mathematical expression of locality similar to the above direct product of
probabilities. The other concept necessary for the derivation of Bell’s original inequality
was a notion of “classical realism”, which in the 1964 paper takes the form of classical
hidden variables and the counterfactual definiteness they imply.7 In his 1975 paper he
introduced the more general concept of “local beables”. However, some of these beables
functioned in the same way as the hidden variables in his 1964 paper and so it is not
surprising that an inequality he derived from these assumptions is violated by the predic-
tions of quantum mechanics thereby revealing that quantum mechanics violated locality
as he defined it.
The phenomenon of entanglement is not restricted to quantum mechanics. Two classi-
cal systems that interact with each other before moving off in different directions are also
entangled. To the extent that the interaction can be completely characterized, one can
predict the correlations of all possible measurements made on the two systems whether
space-like separated or not. Furry discussed a classical entangled system involving cards
in boxes and concluded[20]:
There is no contradiction with relativity, and the attaining of information
from one place or the other is just what it sounds like. The difference, of
course, between the classical and the quantum picture is that the quantum
mechanical state does not correspond to this because this nice classical picture
of the box with two envelopes is the hidden parameter description and the
hidden parameter description is denied in quantum mechanics. But this is the
only difference between the two things and there is no difference at all about
the questions of information and of distance and time.
What distinguishes quantum entanglement from its classical counterpart is simply the
superposition of states and the quantum interference it implies.
There is certainly no doubt that quantum entanglement is a much richer phenomenon
than its classical counterpart, cf. quantum information and quantum computing. How-
ever, we all know that quantum mechanics is, in general, much richer than classical
7The standard Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is counterfactually indefinite be-
cause one cannot make definite statements about the hypothetical results of measurements of quantities
corresponding to non-commuting operators.
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mechanics. Quantum theory is capable of describing atoms and their interactions, the
properties of solids, liquids, and gases, and is applicable not only to physical systems but
to chemistry and, by inference, biology as well, whereas classical mechanics has much
less to offer for such systems. Quantum entanglement, as Mermin declared[4], “...is
as close to magic as any physical phenomenon...and magic should be enjoyed.” What
I have endeavored to demonstrate is that Bell’s theorem and what it reveals have lit-
tle to do with quantum nonlocality, superluminal propagation, and even entanglement.
Rather, they follow directly from the single particle quantum mechanical superposition,
|1, ↑〉z = cos θ2 |1, ↑〉n + sin θ2 |1, ↓〉n. The simple examples above are intended to demon-
strate that the correlations of entangled states can be understood in terms of the standard
quantum superposition of any system whether entangled or not.
So I suppose that my account is what Wiseman called a refusal to consider the cor-
relations mysterious. However, that’s not quite right. I absolutely think the correlations
are mysterious, that is, I don’t have “rocks in my head”. I simply embrace the mysteries
of quantum mechanics. Rather, it’s the nonlocality view that endeavors to force a kind of
classicism on phenomena that are patently non-classical. As for Bell’s exhortation that
“the scientific attitude is that correlations cry out for explanation”, I absolutely agree.
However, as I frequently have to remind my students, correlation does not necessarily
mean causation. Rather my explanation for the observed correlations of entangled states
is the quantum behavior of matter and radiation.
6 The Incompleteness of Quantum Mechanics
The conclusion of the EPR paper was neither that quantum mechanics yields incorrect
predictions nor that quantum mechanics is nonlocal. Rather it was that quantum me-
chanics does not provide a complete description of reality. The argument in EPR, while
peripherally invoking the reduction of the wave function, did not even mention the con-
cept of locality but rather involved a rather byzantine analysis involving a definition of
elements of reality. The EPR manuscript was written in Einstein’s absence by Podolsky
and Einstein was not happy with it. In particular, it had “not come out as well as I really
wanted; on the contrary, the main point was, so to speak, buried by the erudition”[16].
Rather, Einstein based his argument for incompleteness on his principle of separation (as
discussed above), which explicitly invokes both locality and the reduction of the wave
function.
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For the reasons stated above, I don’t find this argument convincing; however, Einstein
was certainly not alone in his contention that quantum mechanics does not provide a com-
plete description of reality. Many prominent physicists have spoken to the incompleteness
of quantum mechanics including Pauli, Dyson, Furry, Wigner, and others. In a sense
even Bohr, Einstein’s chief adversary in these matters, acknowledged the incompleteness
of quantum mechanics by insisting that measurements must necessarily be described in
ordinary language outside the formalism of quantum mechanics. Dyson[21] made the in-
completeness more explicit through four sensible gedanken experiments, couched in the
ordinary language of measurements and experimental physics, that defy quantum mechan-
ical explanation. Quantum mechanics quite simply cannot be applied to all conceivable
situations. For Dyson, the dividing line between classical and quantum physics is the
same as the dividing line between the past and the future. The wave function constitutes
a statistical prediction of future events. After the event occurs, the wave function doesn’t
collapse rather it becomes irrelevant.8 The results of past observations, facts, are the do-
main of classical physics; the statistical probabilities of future events, wave functions, are
the domain of quantum physics. Ergo, quantum mechanics does not provide a complete
description of nature.
It’s interesting to consider Bell’s theorem in this context. Dyson demonstrated that
the inappropriate application of quantum mechanics to the motion of a particle in the
past results in a violation of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. The flip side is that
the inappropriate application of a classical notion of locality results in a violation of Bell’s
inequality for future events and the concomitant claim of quantum nonlocality[23].
Wigner[22] and Furry[20] made the Bohrian argument that the notions of measurement
and experiment necessarily fall outside the realm of quantum mechanics and for that
matter outside the realm of classical mechanics. Stapp chose to emphasize this pragmatic
view of experiments by using the word specifications, i.e.,[24]
Specifications are what architects and builders, and mechanics and ma-
chinists, use to communicate to one another conditions on the concrete social
realities or actualities that bind their lives together. It is hard to think of a
theoretical concept that could have a more objective meaning. Specifications
are described in technical jargon that is an extension of everyday language.
This language may incorporate concepts from classical physics. But this fact
8Wigner[22] made essentially the same point.
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in no way implies that these concepts are valid beyond the realm in which
they are used by technicians.
Quantum mechanics pays scant attention to measurement other than the (not universal)
contention that measurements cause the wave function to collapse. Even the EPR paper
invokes the notion of wave function collapse. The problem is that wave function collapse,
even if (contrary to Dyson’s and Wigner’s contentions) it were a sensible concept, is not
predicted by quantum mechanics. It is an event that happens outside the mathematical
formalism of the theory. In fact, formal quantum theory says absolutely nothing at all
about measurements and how they should be performed or even how to interpret the
results of measurements. The statistical distributions of quantum mechanical predictions
follow from rules for how to interpret the constructs of quantum theory in terms of the
results of experiments. The measurements themselves are not described by quantum
theory but rather by the operational prescriptions of the experimentalists and technicians
who perform them. This is yet another sense in which quantum mechanics is incomplete.
Finally, Einstein was willing to consider another resolution to the EPR “paradox” if
one were to assume that quantum mechanics does not apply to a single system but rather
only to an ensemble of similarly prepared systems. In his words, “The Ψ function does not
in any way describe a condition which could be that of a single system; it relates rather
to many systems, to ‘an ensemble of systems’ in the sense of statistical mechanics.”[25]
The ensemble interpretation, while minimalist, is considered by many to be the most
reasonable interpretation of quantum mechanics (e.g., see Ballentine[26]). While Einstein
admitted that “such an interpretation eliminates also the [EPR] paradox”, he added “To
believe this is logically possible without contradiction; but, it is so very contrary to my
scientific instinct that I cannot forego the search for a more complete conception.” In
other words, he would still strongly suspect that quantum mechanics is incomplete.
7 Final Remarks
In this paper I argue that the “magic” of entangled quantum states has little to do
with nonlocality, superluminal interactions, or even entanglement itself but rather is yet
another example of quantum mechanical superposition, which is magic even in the context
of a single particle. On the other hand, I have no real criticism of Bell’s 1964 proof. So
what is it that Bell’s theorem is telling us? For me, it is a nifty demonstration of why
it is that hidden variable theories of quantum mechanics do not work. As such it can
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serve, if properly presented, as a useful pedagogical tool to help beginning students of
quantum mechanics overcome an initial tendency to view the “wave function” as simply
a replacement for the notion of “particle” in the description of nature. However, for me
Furry’s 1936 response to the EPR paper and to Bohr’s published reply provides a more
straightforward demonstration, in the context of two interacting (entangled) systems, of
the difference between an intuitive classical minded model that students often conjure and
what quantum mechanics actually says. Furry wrote his paper only a few months after
the EPR-Bohr exchange and Bell cited it in the very first sentence of his 1964 paper.
Furry[27] considers the wave function for two systems (I and II) that interacted in
the past and now have ceased to interact. “One can show that there always exists an
expansion, which is in general unique, in the form
Ψ(x1, x2) =
∑
k
wk
1
2φk(x1)ξk(x2) (7.6)
where the φk are eigenfunctions of an observable L... and the ξk are eigenfunctions of an
observable R...” Furry’s classically minded hypothesis is that “during the interaction of the
two systems each system made a transition to a definite state, in which it now is, system
I being in one of the states φk and system II in one of the states ξk.” There is no way to
predict into which pair of states, φkξk , the systems end up, only that the probability of
ending up in any of the pairs is given by wk. This sort of picture often finds itself in the
minds of beginning students of quantum mechanics. It is one that preserves the primary
status of the wave function and associated probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics
and yet allows the classical notion that spatially separated systems have independent
properties even if these properties are to be specified entirely by quantum mechanical wave
functions. As such, it is a reasonable model for the type of reality, i.e., the real properties
of systems, that Einstein wanted to preserve. Furry then proceeds to demonstrate that
while this hypothesis gives the same answers as quantum mechanics for most of the
questions raised in discussions of the theory of measurements, there is a general class of
questions where contradictions occur, namely those measurements involving “the well-
known phenomenon of ‘interference’ between probability amplitudes.” Furry concluded
that “...there is of course nothing ’magical’ about the affair. The interference effect does
not come in unless there has been an actual opportunity for the two particles to get
interchanged, just as in the case in hand there is never any relation between the systems
without the existence of an actual dynamical interaction to start it.”[28] Furry’s classically
motivated hypothesis results in the same product of probabilities that Bell and Shimony
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use as a condition of locality and so it is no mystery why Furry’s hypothesis results in the
same disagreement with standard quantum interference.
Furry’s analysis is in some ways more general than Bell’s in that he doesn’t specify
a particular type of quantum state and in some ways less general in that he specifies a
particular classically minded hypothesis rather than some general specification of hidden
variables. For me, Furry’s analysis is the better pedagogical tool for helping students
of quantum mechanics realize the extent to which quantum mechanics diverges from our
classical intuition. If so, then why is Bell’s paper so well known while Furry’s paper is
largely forgotten?9 Perhaps one reason is that Bell derived a specific test, in the form
of an inequality, that local hidden variable theories satisfy and that quantum mechanics
does not. Another is that by 1964, Bell was able to conceive of actual experiments that
could perform this test, the first of which happened 8 years later.10 Finally, I’m sure
that part of the reason is the subsequent analyses by Bell and others that supposedly
demonstrated the nonlocal character of quantum mechanics and by inference of nature
herself. It is with this conclusion that I take issue.
In the first paragraph of the Introduction I noted David Mermin’s contention that
physicists’ views of Bell’s theorem fall “between the majority position of near indiffer-
ence and the minority position of wild extravagance”[4] and it is perhaps not surprising
that most papers on Bell’s theorem tended toward the minority position and the implied
nonlocality of quantum mechanics. Even so, the contrarian view I have taken is certainly
not solitary. Most physicists seem to prefer to remain silent (the near indifferent ma-
jority); however, some notable scientists, including Gell-Mann, Dyson, Mermin, Furry,
Hartle and Peres, while emphasizing different aspects of entanglement, have expressed
sentiments similar to mine. There are also several philosophers among the skeptics. In
his paper on the epistemological implications of Bell’s Inequality[29], Van Fraassen points
out that most quantum nonlocality arguments hinge on applying the notion of “common
cause” to Bell-type scenarios. He concludes that
...empirical adequacy of a theory consists in it having a model that all the
(models of) actual phenomena will fit into. In some cases, the methodological
tactic of developing a causal theory will achieve this aim of empirical adequacy,
9Bell’s 1964 paper has been cited more than 6000 times in the last 10 years compared to only a handful
of citations of Furry’s 1936 paper in that time period.
10Also, these experiments proved to be seminal in the emerging field of quantum information and
quantum computing.
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in other case it will not, and that is just the way the world is. The causal
terminology is descriptive, in any case, not of the (models of the) phenomena,
but of the proffered theoretical models. So pervasive has been the success
of causal models in the past, especially in a rather schematic way at a folk-
scientific level, that a mythical picture of causal processes got a grip on our
imagination.
Arthur Fine[30] points out that the notion of nonlocality arises in the context of seeking
an explanation for the correlations of entangled state but then questions whether such
correlations even need to be explained. He argues convincingly “...that it is only the
combination of strong locality with determinism from which the satisfaction of the Bell
inequalities follows.” On the other hand, quantum mechanics is decidedly indeterminis-
tic and so there is no path from the violation of Bell’s inequalities to the nonlocality of
quantum mechanics. One might worry that this indeterminism would be a problem for
the strict probabilistic laws that quantum mechanics predicts for repeated measurements
on an ensemble of similarly prepared, individual systems. We have apparently become
comfortable with this situation so “Why, from, an indeterminist perspective should the
fact that there is a [correlated] pattern between random sequences require any more ex-
plaining than the fact that there is a pattern internal to the sequences themselves?” Fine
answers this question as follows,
The search for “influences” or for common causes is an enterprise external to
quantum theory. It is a project that stands on the outside and asks whether we
can supplement the theory in such a way as to satisfy certain a priori demands
on explanatory adequacy. Among these demands is that stable correlations
require explaining, that there must be some detailed account of how they
are built up, or sustained, over time and space. In the face of this demand,
the correlations of the quantum theory can seem anomalous, even mysterious.
But this demand represents an explanatory ideal rooted outside the quantum
theory, one learned and taught in the context of a different kind of physical
thinking...The quantum theory takes for granted not only that sequences of
individually undetermined events may show strict overall patterns, it also
takes for granted that such patterns may arise between the matched events in
two such sequences. From the perspective of quantum theory, this is neither
surprising nor puzzling. It is the normal and ordinary state of affairs.
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So Fine might characterize Bell’s previously quoted exhortation that “correlations cry out
for explanation” as one that was learned in the context of a different kind of (classical)
physical thinking and therefore not appropriate in a discussion of quantum entanglement.
I find the arguments of these authors convincing as is undoubtedly evident from the
present paper. My arguments have been less general and more pragmatic than their
more theoretical and philosophical treatments. I trust that this experimentalist’s per-
spective will make a useful contribution to the dialog about Bell’s theorem and quantum
nonlocality.
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